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ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND CONCLUSIONARY
FINDINGS
L

INTRODUCTION

In Nebraska, as well as in other jurisdictions, a large segment
of the economy is regulated and controlled by administrative agencies. It is, therefore, very important that the action taken by
these administrative agencies be fair and just. Nebraska, however,
does not have a code of standard procedures for administrative
agencies, and it is submitted that inconsistency and injustice have
resulted from this deficiency.' The purpose of this article is to
deal extensively with one particular administrative problem in Nebraska and pose a possible solution. It is suggested that this problem may be illustrative of shortcomings that may exist in other
state administrative agencies which are similarly structured.
The scope of this article is limited to the activities of the Nebraska State Railway Commission (hereinafter referred to as the
"commission") .2 The commission handles the regulation of all common carriers in the state, but the regulation of motor carriers constitutes the bulk of its activity. The discussion of procedural shortcomings in this article is limited to those which stem from the
control the commission exercises over motor carriers.
The Nebraska Constitution s gives the commission wide discretionary power over matters within its control. 4 This discretion
1 The need for such a code was recognized in Harding, Practice and Pro-

cedure Before the Nebraska State Railway Commission, 37 NEB. L. REV.
486 (1958). "The Administrative Law Section has given consideration
to a State Administrative Procedure Act. The need for such an Act
is imperative. Its enactment would guarantee to all a code of standard
procedures applicable to all the various administrative tribunals." Id.
at 500.
2

Two articles which are relevant to this discussion are Overcash, Practice and Procedure Before the Nebraska State Railway Commission,
28 NEB. L. REV. 242 (1949), which presents a comprehensive treatment

of the jurisdiction and functions of the commission, and Harding, Practice and Procedure Before the Nebraska State Railway Commission,
37 NEB. L. REV. 486 (1958), which discusses some of the problems en-

countered in the presentation of the more common proceedings before
the commission.
3 NEB. CONsT. art. IV, § 20, provides in part: "The powers and duties of
such commission shall include the regulation of rates, service and general control of common carriers as the Legislature may provide by
law. But, in the absence of specific legislation, the commission shall
exercise the powers and perform the duties enumerated in this provision."
4 See Lincoln Traction Co. v. City of Lincoln, 103 Neb. 229, 171 N.W. 192

(1919), holding that the constitutional power conferred upon the com-

COMMENTS
may properly be limited by the legislature through specific legislation5 and the legislature has in fact passed a number of statutes
limiting the commission's power. 6 The delegation of power in the
constitution allows the commission to perform legislative, executive, and judicial functions in controlling the activities of common
carriers.7 In reviewing a final ruling or order of the commission,
the Nebraska Supreme Court has limited itself to consideration
of two aspects: whether the commission has acted within its jurisdiction and whether the commission has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.8 Considering the broad powers of the commission, the
court must be able to effectively evaluate the actions of the commission within these bounds.
What, then, does the court have available to guide it in reviewing decisions of the commission? When the commission makes
a final determination in a matter concerning a motor carrier, the
decision is almost invariably made in the form of a one or two
sentence conclusionary finding. This is all that the carrier has to
work with in conforming his activities to the direction of the commission and if the carrier wants to appeal this determination to
the Nebraska Supreme Court, the court has little more than this
as a record to refer to in reviewing the action of the commission. In addition, changes in the membership of the commission
may result in policy inconsistencies and changes because the new
commissioners will have no way of knowing the reasons behind
prior decisions.
At present there is no requirement that the commission report any findings of fact or reasons for its conclusion in a particular
case. The commission has taken the initiative in clarifying some
aspects of its activities, 9 but at present all that is usually reported
in a final decision of the commission is its conclusion. The following sections of this article are designed to show the ineffectiveness
mission gives it the same general control and power in regulation of
rates and services that the people of the state could exercise.
5 Union Transfer Co. v. Bee Line Motor Freight, 150 Neb. 280, 34 N.W.2d
363 (1948).
6 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 74-101 to 75-801 (Reissue 1966).
7 Overcash, Practice and Procedure Before the Nebraska State Railway
Commission, 28 NEB. L. RE V.242, 244 (1949).
8 Publix Cars, Inc. v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 130 Neb. 401, 265 N.W.
234 (1936); Central Bridge & Constr. Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 128
Neb. 779, 260 N.W. 172 (1935).
9 The rules and regulations of the Nebraska State Railway Commission
established procedural formalities which the parties or their lawyers
must comply with in actions before the commission as well as some
specific regulations for each type of carrier,
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of judicial review under the present procedural practices of the commission. This will be illustrated by an analysis of some of the
cases handled by the court which deal with the phrase "occasionally to and from various points within the State of Nebraska at
large."10
IL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONCLUSIONARY FINDNGS
In 1937 the Nebraska Legislature passed an act regulating
intrastate motor carriers which was to be administered and enforced by the State Railway Commission." The act made it unlawful for any motor carrier subject to the act to carry on intrastate operations unless it had a certificate of public convenience
and necessity authorizing those operations. 12 The commission
was authorized to issue this certificate without proof of public convenience and necessity to all carriers that were in actual bona fide
13
operation on April 1, 1936, and had so operated since14that time.
This is the so-called "grandfather" clause of the act.
In issuing a certificate under the "grandfather" clause, the
commission held hearings in which truckers described their prior
operations and a certificate was issued granting corresponding authority. Most of the carriers did the bulk of their hauling between certain specific points, but occasionally they would travel
to and from other points throughout the state when busines would
so demand. When the commission began issuing these certificates,
it described each carrier's operation in almost the very words used
by the applicant in describing his route. Due to the small amount
of time allowed for the procedure and because it was easier for the
examiners to use similar language to describe all operations of a
similar nature carried on by different carriers, certain phrases came
to be "terms of art"-descriptive of certain types of activities. As
was noted above, 15 the words of the certificate were not as crucial
This phrase was taken from an order by the Nebraska State Railway
Commission on the application of C. H. Kleinholz, which was made
and entered at Lincoln, Nebraska on February 24, 1938. A mimeographed copy of the order was obtained by the author from the Nebraska State Railway Commission.
11 Neb. Laws c. 142, p. 526 (1937).
12 Neb. Laws c. 142, § 7 (1937).
's Id.
14 Theoretically, the motor carrier who obtained a certificate under this
clause was given the authority to carry on the same activities as he
had been before the issuance of the certificate. The measure of his
future authority was not the wording of the certificate but the type
of motor carrier activity that he was carrying on during the stipulated
period of time.
15 See supra note 12.
10
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in determining the carrier's authority as were the actual activities
carried on by the carrier at the time of issuance of his certificate
under the "grandfather" clause. A literal interpretation of the
meaning of the words of authority under a "grandfather" certificate could, if construed differently from the carrier's original acrestriction or expansion of a cartivities, result in an unwarranted
16
rier's granted authority.
Interpretation of authority under a certificate occurs after the
commission is called on to determine the propriety of operations
under this phrase. 1'7 An examiner for the commission first holds
a hearing and a decision is made by this examiner. In most cases,
this decision is based on "whether or not his [the carrier's] operations are within or without the authority of his certificate."'18
After this hearing is completed, an unsatisfied carrier can ask the
board of commissioners to review the determination of the examiner. They review the report of the examiner and rule on its
propriety in a proceeding much like a court review. The ruling or
decision by the commission on the point is given in the form of a
written conclusion. This conclusionary finding contains no finding
of the facts on which the ruling was based, nor does it include the
reasoning on which the commission based its conclusion. Other
than the short written conclusion which is given to the carrier,
the decisions and orders of the commission are not codified or reported in any way.' 9 After the final order of the commission is
rendered, the unsatisfied carrier may ask for review of this determination by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
As was noted above, 20 the court reviews the commission's orders only to determine whether they have acted within the scope
16 An example of the handling of one of these phrases by the court will
be shown infra.
17 The commission may be called on to interpret the certificates on a
number of occasions: (1)if there is a complaint by a competing carrier; (2) when a carrier wants to transfer a certificate; (3) when a
carrier wants to extend his certificate; and (4) when there is an order
for clarification of the certificate. In all of these instances the commission will hold a hearing in which other carriers are notified and
may present their viewpoint or reasons why the commission should or
should not grant what is asked by the carrier.
18 Kassebaum v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 142 Neb. 645, 650, 7 N.W.2d
464, 468 (1943).
19 Harding, Practice and Procedure Before the Nebraska State Railway
Commission, 37 NEB.L. Rav. 486, 487 (1958).
20 See Publix Cars, Inc. v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co., 130 Neb. 401, 265
N.W. 234 (1938); Central Bridge & Constr. Co., 128 Neb. 779, 260 N.W.
172 (1935).
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of their jurisdiction or whether they acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. It is hard to see how the court can effectively determine
whether a ruling of the commission is arbitrary or unreasonable
if they have no more to go by than the bald conclusion of the
commission. 21 It is submitted that it is unwise and unrealistic
for the court to attempt to review the actions of the commission
with no more than this to guide them.
Since the authority granted under the "grandfather" provisions of the 1937 act was limited by carrier activity prior to the
issuance of these certificates, 22 proper control of the carrier's rights
under these certificates should flow from an analysis of these activities. The phrases in the certificates issued under the "grandfather" clause of the 1937 act became terms of art when used
by the commission to describe the activities of the carriers. In one
sense the words were fixed as to the meaning attached to them by
the carriers and the commission at the time of issuance of a "grandfather" certificate. But in another sense, these words were inadequate to convey an accurate description of the activities of each
carrier's unique operation. A court could be led into believing that
the words of authority in a certificate were to be interpreted by
using conventional tools of contract interpretation. Without the
benefit of the esoteric meanings attached to these words by those
in the motor carrier business and without cognizance of the significance of carrier activity before the issuance of the certificate, the
court errs in substituting tools of language interpretation designed
for other contexts. With nothing more than a conclusion of the
commission to guide them, it is possible that the court could hand
down a ruling which would take away part of the authority granted
by the certificate or, on the other hand, the court could add to the
authority given and thus diminish the control the commission has
over the carrier.
Just such a situation is presented in Kassebaum v. Nebraska
State Ry. Comm'n.23 Here the carrier had obtained a certificate
under the "grandfather" clause which provided that he was to
have "irregular route" authority. The commission issued a conclusion that the carrier was operating outside his authority because
he was doing "regular route" business. The carrier appealed and
21

22
23

If the case involved a certificate issued under the "grandfather" clause,
it is possible that the court could review the original hearing held by
the commission in order to determine whether the commission acted
unreasonably. However, the only records of these hearings is in shorthand which is seldom transcribed and is usually poorly catalogued and
filed, so in many cases it is impossible to find these records.
See supra note 12.
142 Neb. 645, 7 N.W.2d 464 (1943).
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the supreme court reversed. The court held that the commission
was not granted the authority to classify the carrier under the 1937
act and hence the only determination it could make was whether
his certificate authorized the type of operation he was carrying on.
The court felt that the words "irregular routes" involved only the
way taken and not the times traveled: "Certainly the term 'ir24
regular routes' cannot be construed to mean irregular times.1
Using this reasoning, they concluded that the authority granted in
the words "irregular route" was broader and included the authority
to operate on both "irregular" and "regular routes."
The problem with this holding is that the carriers and the
commission had always interpreted "regular route" and "irregular
route" service to be totally distinct concepts. The terms when
used by the carriers and by the commision had described operations which were either regular or irregular as to both time and
route. When the court interpreted these phrases as having a different meaning from that attached to them by the carriers, i.e., by
segregating time and route, the effect was to add to the authority
given to the carrier under his certificate, leaving the commission
with no way of regulating carriers who had only been authorized
to carry on "irregular route" operations in the term's original
sense. The court also held that the regulation of time of travel by
the commission would be an attempt to classify the carriers-a
power which was outside the commission's jurisdiction under the
court's construction of the statute.
The above illustration shows how a misinterpretation of the actions of the commission and a ruling that a particular order was
outside its jurisdiction could have the effect of preventing the exercise of legitimate control over carriers. 25 Had the commission
clarified its ruling on the certificate by a finding of facts showing
either the activities of the carrier before the issuance of the certificate and the significance of these activities with regard to the authority granted in the certificate, or else a factual finding as to the
connotations of the words in the key phrases, this misunderstanding could have been avoided.
Another aspect of review by the court is the test of whether
24
25

Id. at 655, 7 N.W.2d at 470.
The 1943 legislature passed a statute allowing the commission to classify
carriers. Neb. Laws c. 169, § 1 (1943), which is now NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 75-304 (Reissue 1966). A logical conclusion which can be drawn
from this action is that there was some need for such a statute after
the Kassebaum case, to permit commission control over the times at
which carriers were operating. An example of how the court chose to
apply the statute to the certificates may be found in Abler Transfer,
Inc. v. Lyon, 161 Neb. 378, 73 N.W.2d 667 (1955).
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the acts of the commission were arbitrary or unreasonable. A
phrase which was used repeatedly in describing operations of a
carrier other than those constituting the bulk of his business was
the authorization to operate "occasionally to and from various
points within the State of Nebraska at Large. '26 This phrase was
descriptive of demand operations carried on by the carrier at the
time that the "grandfather" clause certificates were issued. A line
of cases interpreting this phrase serves further to illustrate why
the court cannot properly review action of the commission without
the benefit of the facts or reasons underlying the conclusions of
the commission It must be kept in mind that under the grandfather clause it is the actual activity before issuance, and not just
the words in the certificate which delimit the scope of authority of
the carrier. It is easy to see how a decision by the court based
solely on the words in the certificate could restrict or expand the
authority granted a carrier.
Since most of the business done by the carriers was described
to the examiners as "the bulk of their business" on the one hand
and "the occassional" or "on demand" segment on the other hand,
it is not unreasonable to conclude that the phrase in question, "and
occasionally to and from various points within the State of Nebraska at Large," meant the lesser amount of business, done on 2a7
call and demand basis at the time of issuance of the certificate.
If this were the case, the meaning of the phrase "occasionally to
and from various points within the State of Nebraska at Large"
would merely mean irregular route operation. The reason for its
being set apart from the bulk of the irregular route operation was
that this was the way the carriers described their operations to the
examiners and the examiners followed this method of description
in writing the certificates.
One of the early cases involving the interpretation of that particular phrase was Meyer v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n.2 8 Here
the carrier's current operations were between all points in the state
and the commission questioned this scope of activity under the language in the certificate, "occasionally to and from various points in
all sections of the State of Nebraska." The carrier read this provi26

27
28

This phrase was used, with minor deviations, in many of the certificates
of convenience and necessity which were issued under the "grandfather" provisions of the 1937 motor carrier act. A discussion of the
reasons for the repeated occurence of this phrase in these certificates
may be found supra.
This inference is supported by the discussion of the origination of this
phrase supra.
150 Neb. 455, 34 N.W.2d 904 (1948).

COMMENTS
sion as allowing him to operate anywhere within the state, but the
commission interpreted the phrase to limit the carrier's operation
to call and demand service either originating or ending in the base
area mentioned in the first part of his certificate. The court upheld the interpretation of the certificate by the commission, but in
doing so they made a broad statement which, read literally, would
not even allow call and demand service from the base point to and
from points throughout the state.29 Since the commission had not
ruled that the phrase would not allow such call and demand service,
but merely that each trip on the call and demand service must
originate or terminate in a base area, the court's statement was
unwarranted. Again, had the court had the benefit of more than
a conclusion from the commission, they probably would not have
made this statement.
In Canada v. Transit Inc. 30 the certificate held by the carrier
contained substantially the same key words as those in the Meyer
case. Here the commission had revoked the certificate held by
Canada Transport and issued a new one. The court reversed the
order because Canada had not shown that present or future public
convenience and necessity required the operations authorized in
the new certificate. There was reference made to the scope of
authority under the first certificate but the court recognized that
"it is not proper or necessary to determine what if any significance
this language has in the certificate."'
However, the court went
on to magnify further the broad statement made in the Meyer
case. It quoted that language and stated that the provision "'and
occasionally to and from points within the State of Nebraska at
large,' obviously was not intended to authorize common carrier
operations to and from all locations in the state. '32 Even though
the statement made in Meyer was admittedly dictum, the court
has strengthened it through this pronouncement and may well
have almost precluded call and demand operations to and from
points throughout the state under their interpretation of this phrase.
If these words originally authorized call and demand service,
the effect of these judicial statements could be to take away legitimate authority granted to carriers by the 1937 motor carrier act.
"[I]f this court permitted the appellants to haul freight to and from all
parts of the state, even occasionally, as they contend their certificate
permitted them to do, it would rewrite their certificate so that it would
contain no limitation or restriction on the business they could conduct
under it." Id. at 460, 34 N.W.2d at 906.
30 154 Neb. 256, 47 N.W.2d 507 (1951).
3' Id. at 260, 47 N.W.2d at 510.
32 Id. at 260, 47 N.W.2d at 510.
29
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A further muddying of the meaning of the phrase results from
dictum in Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n v. Service Oil Co. 33 Here
the court was concerned with an order of the commission which revoked and cancelled part of the carrier's certificate for willful violation of the commission rules and of the Nebraska Motor Carrier
Act. The issue of whether the order was arbitrary or unreasonable turned upon whether the carrier was operating as a regular
route carrier when he was only authorized to operate as an irregular route carrier. The court said the finding of willful violation
was well grounded. The court at one point cited the Meyer and
Canada cases for the proposition that "whatever occasional irregular permission was given it by the certificate must necessarily
mean something less than an unqualified irregular route opera34
tion.,
The language used in the Service Oil case was later discussed
in Abler Transfer, Inc. v. Lyon.3 5 Here the court was concerned
with an order of the commission which changed and restricted the
authority given the carrier under the "grandfather" clause. The
court held that part of the action of the commission was unreasonable and another part of it was not. In doing so, they recognized that the language used by the court in the Service Oil case
would point to a holding the other way.36 They then pointed out
the proper significance of that case's language by this statement:
"In considering certain language used in Nebraska State Railway
it should be remembered that
Commission v. Service Oil Co ....
the question here involved was not therein ruled on nor was it
necessary to do so in order to determine the issues therein presented."3 7 It appears from this statement that the line of cases developing a meaning to the phrase in question has little or no significance to the court at this point. They have recognized the pronouncements as dictum.
A recent case again presented the court with an opportunity to
establish the meaning of the phrase. In Andrews Van Lines, Inc.
v. Nielsen & Petersen, Inc.,38 the commission had granted an application by Andrews for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity which would authorize him to operate on a statewide call
and demand basis. Competing carriers appealed from this deter33
34
35
36

37
38

157 Neb. 712, 61 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
Id. at 718, 61 N.W.2d at 385.
161 Neb. 378, 73 N.W.2d 667 (1955).
The language referred to is the sentence quoted from the Service Oil
case in the text accompanying note 31 supra.
161 Neb. 378, 385, 73 N.W.2d 667, 672 (1955).
180 Neb. 764, 145 N.W.2d 584 (1966).
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mination, maintaining that the commission had acted arbitrarily
and unreasonably in granting this certificate. They argued that
Andrews had never had the authority to operate on a statewide
irregular basis, and that it would be unreasonable to give him such
authority, as public convenience and necessity did not justify it.
The issue turned on the interpretation of Andrews' original certificate granted under the "grandfather" clause, which gave him the
authority to operate "occasionally to and from various points within
the State of Nebraska at Large." If these words gave him statewide call and demand authority in the original certificate, then the
position of the appellant competitors would have no foundation.
The court presented the problem as follows. Andrews had
asked the commission in 1938 whether statewide irregular operation
was authorized by his certificate; the commission at that time told
him that it was. 39 But the court then said: "[B]y the late 1940's
and early 1950's, it was judicially determined in other cases that
the words 'and occasionally to and from various points within the
State of Nebraska at large' in a certificate did not authorize nonradial irregular route statewide operation." 40 The court is referring to the Meyer, Canada, and Service Oil cases (though they
didn't cite them specifically), and it seems that, even though the
construction of that phrase was dictum in all of those cases, the
court has used that dubious authority to permit the confiscation of
part of the rightful scope of operation given to carriers under the
"grandfather" clause of the 1937 act. The court, however, did not
rule on this basis and instead affirmed the order of the commission
on the ground that Andrews had operated under sufficient "color
of authority" during this period to keep the action of the commission from being arbitrary or unreasonable.
Thus it seems that the court currently resolves the issue of
the meaning of the phrase "occasionally to and from various points
within the State of Nebraska at Large" by allowing the commission to interpret it ad hoc in particular cases and then reviewing
the cases when necessary through a "color of authority" test.
The significance of this line of cases is not that the court was
inconsistent in developing the law on this point, nor that it was
necessarily unreasonable in its interpretations of the phrase. The
39 Note that these facts support the earlier conclusion that the interpretation placed on the phrase by the commission and the carriers was that
it meant call and demand service. If this is the proper meaning of the
phrase, the commission would not be arbitrary and unreasonable in
holding the way they did.
40 Andrews Van Lines, Inc. v. Nielsen & Petersen, Inc., 180 Neb. 764, 765,
145 N.W.2d 584, 586 (1966).
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point is that the court had no way of knowing whether the action
of the commission was arbitrary or unreasonable when all they
had was a conclusionary finding to review. Had the commission
provided the court with some findings of fact or statements of
reasoning in addition to their conclusions, this problem probably
would never have existed. Undoubtedly there are many other specific examples of unclear or inequitable situations which have
arisen due to the lack of a record of the administrative agencies'
deliberations.
There is a substantial portion of the economy of Nebraska involved in the activities controlled by the railway commission. In
addition, the nature of the power of the commission requires effective control by the court within its scope of review. These factors all lead to the conclusion that some way must be established
to require the commission to report the facts and the reasons for
its conclusions.
III.

SOLUTION

Action should be taken which would require the Nebraska
State Railway Commission to write and report findings of fact or
reasoning which support their conclusionary orders. Although the
scope of the problems presented here are limited, some of the solutions posed could affect all the administrative agencies in the state.
One alternative is for the legislature to enact a State Administrative Procedure Act. If this were done the legislature could properly consider whether to include or exclude from the act any particular administrative agency.
The requirements for federal administrative agencies as to the
sufficiency of their findings provides one model for consideration:
The accepted ideal, as stated by the Supreme Court, is that "the
orderly functioning of the process of review requires that the
agency acted be clearly disgrounds upon which that admistrative
4
closed and adequately sustained. 1
In adjudication-type hearings governed by the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, all decisions are required to include a statement of findings and conclusions, as well as the reasons or bases
issues of fact, law, or discretion
therefor, upon all the material
42
presented on the record.
Looking at these rules, it would seem that the records required of
the federal administrative agencies are as complete as those customarily expected from courts. In some instances, these agencies
41
42

K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TExT § 16.01 (1959).
2 Am. JuR. 2d Administrative Law § 455 (1962).
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specific reasons and findings of
are required to give much more
43
fact than trial courts usually do.
It would seem that control of state administrative agencies
would not need to be as stringent, and as a general rule most states
do not have such specific requirements as to the sufficiency of
the findings and orders. One writer, in referring to state administrative procedure acts, stated that "a common requirement in all
the acts is that decisions adverse to a party to the proceeding in a
contested case shall be in writing, shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law, and shall be delivered to each
party."44 But he goes on to say that even in the states which
have
have these requirements only "occasionally, agency decisions
'4 5
been rejected for failure to observe these standards.
The best reasons for requiring findings is that they are necessary for judicial review and that they aid the agency in its decision making process. 46 The requirements concerning administrative
findings, whether in state or federal situations, are usually based
on court decisions in reviewing administrative action which is later
codified into legislative requrements.
As a practical matter, there are two ways in which the commission could be required to publish more than mere conclusionary
findings. One way is for the Nebraska Supreme Court to remand
cases that come before it from the commission and require some
findings of fact which are the basis for the conclusions, before they
will hear the case. Another way is for the legislature to enact a
procedure act which would require some destate administrative
47
tailed findings.
Most of the decisions involving findings of an administrative
agency test the specificity of these findings under a statutory requirement. 48 However, the court would not be acting without
43

44

The cases discussing these ideals are Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and Securities Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).

F.

HEADY, ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE LEGISLATION IN

=H STATES 88

(1952).
45 Id.
46 See
47

2 F. COOPER,

STATE ADm-ISTRATVE LAW

465-68 (1965), for a gen-

eral discussion of these reasons.
A good example of a provision which would set up this requirement is
the Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 12. A full copy of
this act as amended may be found in the NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF

ComvnVIIssIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 260 (1961).
48 See 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 472 (1965).
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precedent if it were to require findings by the commission as a
matter of procedural due process. 49 One rationale is that a court
cannot decide rationally whether the decision of an agency follows
from the facts as a matter of law, or whether these facts are supported by the evidence unless the findings themselves are revealed.
A determination of arbitrariness or unreasonableness by definition would require that the court be able to determine the commission's reasons for their conclusion. Another ground for requiring findings as a matter of procedural due process is the need to
inform the parties. And, as one court has said, this can be a means
of guaranteeing that the decisions of an agency will be decided according to the evidence and the law. 50 Considering the specific examples shown in this article and the fact that a court could render
such inconsistent, contradictory, and confusing decisions as in the
carriers' cases, it would seem that in nearly all cases reviewed
from the commission, the court would be justified as a matter of
procedural due process in requiring findings of fact.
As was noted above, a pressing reason for the commission reporting findings of fact along with its conclusions is to effectively
notify the carriers throughout the state. Unless the carriers have
that same information that the court needs for review, it is hard to
see how they could be expected to properly conform their actions
to commission requirements. For the sake of uniformity and certainty, then, the better way to solve the problem may be to require,
by legislative directive, a record of facts or reasons underlying the
conclusions of the commission.
Section twelve of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act provides that: "A final decision shall include findings of fact
and conclusions of law, separately stated. Findings of fact, if set
forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings."5 1
A number of states have adopted this specific language and others
52
have reached the same result by a similar statutory requirement.
IV. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly the Nebraska State Railway Commission has
a difficult responsibility in handling the matters under its jurisdicnn. 120 & 121.
50 Saginaw Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 96 F.2d

49 Id. at 471

554, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
51 NATIONAL

CONFERENCE

OF COVIISSIONERS

ox

UNIFORM

supra note 47 at 217-18.
52 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADminISTRATIn LAW 470 (1965).
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tion, but there is a lack of administrative justice under their present
procedure. It is submitted that proper procedural guidelines are
missing in administrative law in our state and something should
be done about it.
Nebraska should have a reasonable and practicable standard of
administrative procedure to guide administrative agencies. This
standard could be established in part by judicial action, but by far
the best solution is for the legislature to enact an administrative
procedure act to ensure a proper code of standards.
Steven D. Brumley, '68

